SUTRA 1
The world-appearance is not the external world.
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In our opening remarks we sought to establish the identity of experience, existence and consciousness, and we described the ground of the world-appearance as an undifferentiated mass of ‘consciousness-as-distinctions’. We also noted that this primary awareness of ‘somethingness’ is unitary and precedes the arising of subject-object dualism. With the birth of the ‘I’-thought/feeling comes the conviction of ‘otherness’. For the naive realist, this subject-object split is a unexamined given, along with the presumption that the subject exists within the body as a kind of ‘ghost in the machine’ directly perceiving an external world. This simple assumption works well enough for the purpose of managing the affairs of daily life, but closer examination will reveal it to be both undemonstrable and the main cause of fear surrounding the idea of death.
If asked, ‘Who or what or where is this ephemeral subject who is perceiving an external world?’, the naive realist automatically points to his body and says, ‘It is here.’. If asked rhetorically, ‘Is it the hands or shoulders, etc, which are the perceiving subject?’, he responds, ‘No, it is my mind.’. Asked, ‘Where is your mind?’, he will likely point to his head and say, ‘Here. Where my brain is.’. If asked, ‘Is your mind identical with your brain?’, he is placed in a dilemma: if he says, ‘no’, he can be asked, ‘then, why are you pointing to your brain as the location of your mind?’, and if he says ‘yes’, then he is asserting that the brain is the perceiving subject. In the former instance he is implying that the mind is a ‘ghost in the machine’ lurking somewhere within the brain or possibly co-extensive with it. In the latter instance, he puts himself in the absurd position of asserting that the perceiving subject (the mind) is identical with a perceivable object (the brain). Both instances are problematic, for in the former, he is asserting a physical location for a non-physical mind, and in the latter, he raises the possibility of the subject perceiving itself as an object while still remaining a subject. In the latter instance, if the point is made that we could theoretically remove part of his forehead and with the aid of a mirror reveal his brain to him while he remains conscious, then he will be pushed into the impossible position of having to assert that, ‘It is my brain/mind as subject which is perceiving my brain/mind as object.’ Of course, he may argue that the actual perceiving part of the brain is located somewhere within the larger brain mass. We would then have to locate that specific portion of the brain and hold it up to the mirror and this will again place us in the same impossible position of the subject perceiving itself as object. He might then argue that if we were to expose or open that section of the brain he would die, all perception would stop and the contradictory situation of the subject perceiving the subject could not arise. But let’s consider. For the naive realist the external world is anything which can be perceived directly by the perceiving subject: he sees, touches, etc., a real world as it really is, i.e., it is an independent fact which is non-different from his experience of it. This also means that whatever is perceivable by the senses, including his body, his face and hands, his sense organs, any part of his brain mass, etc. are also perceived directly by the perceiving subject and are, as well, part and parcel of the external world. Furthermore, it means that any part of his brain which he can observe without terminating perception or destroying the subject is external as well and non-different from his experience of it. Now, even the most microscopic portion of the brain ultimately found to be indispensible to perception and functioning as the perceiving subject must have some measure of dimension and mass. Since the portion of the brain functioning as the perceiver necessarily possesses form and occupies space it must theoretically be perceivable to itself as a self-observable object, if not directly through the senses, then indirectly through the senses by means of a refined and non-invasive technology. Now if the subject is a self-observable object, then to avoid the impossibility of the perceived being simultaneously the perceiver of itself there must be another subject perceiving the self-observable subject perceiving itself as an object, etc., which leads to an infinite regression. This demonstrates the impossibility of the identity of the ultimate perceiving subject with any aspect of the objective organism, however subtle and vital to perception, and any effort to prove such an identity invariably leads to an infinite regression.
These then are the naive realist’s two dilemmas: first, if the mind is not the brain or some part of the brain, then where is it or does it even exist?; second, if the mind is identical with the brain or some part of it, then how do we avoid the impossible scenario of the subject simultaneously perceiving itself as an object? At this point, the naive realist may argue that the perceiving subject is completely distinct from the brain yet dependent on the brain as well as the organs of sense for the purpose of sense-perception. If asked to describe this ‘perciever’, he will have to respond that it is invisible to the senses and therefore indescribable but nevertheless there. If asked, ‘Where does the perceiver reside?’, he will have to say the it is either within or co-extensive with the body or perhaps occupying a space somewhat greater than the body, otherwise he will have to admit that the perceiving mind is infinite and therefore residing either nowhere or everywhere. If he asserts that the mind occupies a certain space though invisible to the senses, then he is ipso facto asserting that the perceiving mind is empirical, i.e., has dimension and form. Now what is empirical is ultimately observable, if not by the naked eye then through the instrumentation of a refined technology. Thus, eventually his mind will become accessible to perception through some scientific means and he will be thrown back into the vicious infinite of a perceiver perceiving the perceiver of a perceiver. If he then adopts the position that his mind is infinite or occupies infinite space, then of course there is no ‘ghost in the machine’ or invisible perceiver occupying a certain time-space position from which it directly perceives an external world.
At this point, the naive realist may drop his naive viewpoint and adopt the strictly materialist position. He may say, ‘There is no immaterial subject or perceiver who is perceiving an external world; there is only a material ‘body-mind’ which is a part of and inseparable from the external world.’ He will then assert that perception and perceiver are simply products of and limited to certain biological processes. Now if the subject is reduced to a material body-mind, then the external world of which he is now a part can no longer be qualified as ‘external’. In the naive realist viewpoint, ‘external world’ means everything which can be perceived and which is separate from or other than the perceiver. The materialist, however, has somehow transformed the immaterial subject into the material body-mind, therefore incorporating himself as a material and integral part of the universe which he is simultaneously observing. But while there are many observable and discrete objects which are ‘external’ to himself as a discrete body-mind, the universe as a totality includes him and is therefore neither external nor observable; for in order to observe the totality of which he is an integral part he would have to stand outside of it, and this a material entity cannot accomplish.
Now the materialist may be quite happy to accept this limitation, but his argument does not, however, resolve the fundamental problem of perception. The materialist asserts that perception is the end product of a process generated by the relationship of the material senses with the material world. While this may not be false, it does not answer the question, ‘What is the nature or composition of the conscious ‘knower’ which is at the receiving end of this material process?’. Whatever this ‘I’ is, it must be utterly immaterial since it is the seer and not the seeable. This seer is the final resting place of the process of perception and since it can never be an object to itself yet remain the seer, it must be beyond perceptability and therefore immaterial and non-empirical. The materialist viewpoint cannot escape the fact that the final resting place of perception is immaterial. Thus while the materialist may argue forcefully that the nature of the entire process of perception is material and energetic, his argument falls down at the final moment when the process of perception is transformed into experience as the perception itself. The very notion of perception as a result of material processes is the result of an intellectual process, whereas the notion itself is an immediate appearance; the conclusion resulting from the former is indirect and subject to doubt, whereas the latter, i.e., the immediate appearance, is direct and undeniable. This is the fundamental distinction which must always be made between an appearance as merely appearing and the content of what is appearing. An appearance as appearance is simply a revelation, while its content may be reflected upon and doubted. The appearance of the intuition, ‘There is a snake in the middle of the road.’, is a revelation and undeniable, whereas the content of the intuition may be questioned as, ‘Could the snake actually be a rope?’. This subsequent questioning of the intuition of a snake is itself a revelation and also undeniable, whereas its content (i.e., ‘Is this really a snake?’) will again subsequently transform into either, ‘This is truly a snake.’ or, ‘This is in fact a rope.’. The point being made here is that appearance or experience is immediate and revelatory, whereas the content of appearance is always transforming and subject to doubt, validation, modification or negation. It is the latter as content which may be validly, yet inferentially, attributed to a process of perception, whereas the former as appearing is of a different order of reality which is neither inferential nor subject to doubt. The fact of appearing is distinct from its content inasmuch as appearing continues to appear as immediate and revelatory, whereas its content is constantly transforming and subject to reflection; the fact of appearance is not subject to doubt, whereas its content is constantly subject to doubt. There is a clear distinction, therefore, between the world-appearance which is itself immediate, revelatory and non-sensual, and the content of the world-appearance which is time-bound, subject to doubt and sensual; it is in this distinction that the argument of the materialist that the nature of perception is purely biological and physical falls down.
The body-mind is an entity in a world of entities, both animate and inanimate; these entities are external to one another, and, collectively, make up the world. The body-mind may be the vehicle by which other objects external to it may be perceived, yet the perception itself is other than the body-mind or its surroundings. The totality of perception includes the perception of the body-mind and its processes, as well as the universe of which the body-mind is a part. This totality embraces all experience, all perception, all knowledge and all phenomenal appearance. All which is conceived, perceived, felt or intuited is contained within this totality, including the empirical subject or ego-self with its thoughts, memories, emotions, dreams, delusions, etc. Whatever may or may not be ‘external’ to this totality of perception is radically different from the externality presumed by the naive realist or the materialist. Their externality is something directly perceivable by the subject or the body-mind, whereas whatever may be external to the totality of perception is not directly perceivable and exists as a mere possibility of purely heuristic value.
Within the totality of perception is the perception of the notion (in the form of the unexamined assumption of the naive realist) that the subject is directly perceiving an external world. This notion undeniably exists as content within the totality of perception, but its own specific content, i.e., that ‘I am a subject directly perceiving an external world’, is undemonstrable. Within the totality, perceptions exist as immediate and present, referring to nothing other than themselves; they are appearances which appear. Collectively, they are a ‘world-appearance’ which, rather than standing apart from a perceiving subject, includes this apperception of an empirical self as part of its content. There is neither an external nor an internal in relation to this world-appearance; the appearance of an idea or emotion or egoic ‘I’-thought/feeling, which is presumed to be ‘internal’, is neither more nor less immediate or present than a tree or any other object which is presumed to be ‘external’: ideas, emotions, trees, etc, being neither internal nor external but purely immediate as appearances. Thus does the perceiver-perceived duality reside as content within the unitary totality of perception comprising the ‘world-appearance’.SUTRA 2
Gross objects are the sum total of their qualities organized conceptually, attributed to sense perception, and considered ‘objective’.
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In the prologue we describe gross objects as collocations of distinctions. We make no reference to the function of the senses in perception, since the notion of the instrumentality of the sense-organs in perception is an inference rather than an immediate apprehension. Further, we describe the mass of undifferentiated distinctions as an intuition of ‘something is happening’ or experience and as the ground of the dualistic subject-object construct upon which the world-appearance is created. This mass of distinctions, by virtue of being undifferentiated, is unified and its very apprehension, within the context of experience, contains the intuition of existence-consciousness. This intuition of existence-consciousness, we assert, is ontologically axiomatic and functions as the self-revealing ground of the world-appearance. Since this unified ground of undifferentiated distinctions does not refer to anything other than itself and carries within itself the intuition of existence-consciousness, we describe distinctions as a unitary ‘consciousness-as-distinctions’ (immediate intuition) rather than as a dualistic ‘consciousness-of-distinctions’ (mediate intuition), where the preposition ‘of’ implies a subject-object split in which a separate consciousness is somehow observing a mass of undifferentiated distinctions.
The formulation of an object within experience cannot arise without an empirical subject as a reference point. The object must stand in a spacial and temporal relation with an observer in order to have physical definition. Thus, the object must necessarily co-exist with an empirical subject in order to be an object, otherwise it remains hidden within the undifferentiated mass of distinctions. The differentiation and collocation of a subset of hitherto undifferentiated ‘consciousness-as-distinctions’ produces an object which stands in relationship to an observer. This observer is loosely identified with the body which is itself a subset of distinctions and which functions as the spacial and temporal locus from which the object is observed. At this point there arises an unexamined realist assumption that ‘consciousness’ is limited to the locus of the observer and that the perceived object itself is non-conscious or material and is being observed by a ‘conscious’ subject connected to the body. In fact, the object is a configuration of ‘consciousness-as-distinctions’ and never loses its status as consciousness. However, in the ordinary realist view, the object is an independent and external entity more or less directly percieved by a conscious mind or ego located in a body. This viewpoint is ignorant of ‘consciousness-as-distinctions’ as the ground of the appearance of the object, and falsely presumes that the observed object and its qualities are something external which the observer is ‘conscious-of’, when in fact the observer or empirical subject, like the perceived object, also arises from the ground of undifferentiated ‘consciousness-as-distinctions’ as the body. It is by virtue of an empirical subject created from the undifferentiated ground than an objective universe can arise and continue. Should the empirical subject disappear, as in deep sleep, so will the universe. Once the empirical subject comes into play the entire ground of distinctions becomes transformed into the ‘qualities’ of the objective world, as well as of the supposedly ‘subjective’ body-mind, and with this is born the illusion that the self is directly perceiving an external world. It is within this context that we understand gross objects to be the sum total of their qualities organized conceptually, falsely attributed directly to sense perception, and considered ‘objective’.SUTRA 3
The gross body is included in the category of ‘gross objects’.
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The body is also configured from the undifferentiated ground, and its constantly changing qualities are, like all other objective phenomena, ‘perceived’ by the empirical subject. The hands and feet, etc, are perceived, and even the organs of sense, the skin, the ears, etc, are perceivable. To whom does the body appear? It appears to the empirical subject. But where does the empirical subject reside, what is its nature and what is its relationship to the body? With this begins the age-old mind-body problem of philosophy. Nevertheless, it is clear that the body fits into the catagory of gross objects, as do all other organic and non-organic bodies.SUTRA 4
The configuration of distinctions into gross objects is an intelligent act.
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How do we explain the transformation of a mass of meaningless, unrelated distinctions into an intelligible gross object which stands in intelligible and dynamic relationships with other such entities?
Undifferentiated distinctions, by virtue of being undifferentiated, have no relatedness to each other, to gross objects or to the empirical self, and are therefore characterized as meaningless. Meaning comes into being through the configuration of distinctions into an object. An object ‘means’ something: it is related to other objects as well as to the empirical subject, it has a purpose and function relative to the empirical subject, and it has a meaningful place in the universe. The hitherto undifferentiated distinctions from which the object is configured also become meaningful in the context of their mutual relations as ‘qualities’ of the object: meaningless distinctions have become transformed into meaningful qualities. The configuration of distinctions is an intelligent act which, in the process of configuring, assigns meaning to the configuration: what was meaningless has become intelligible through an act of intelligence. How do we know that an intelligent act has taken place? It is self-revealed through the coming into being of meaning. Meaning is not a sensuous intuition, yet the transformation of what is undifferentiated, indeterminate, untelligible and meaningless into what is differentiated, determinate, intelligible and meaningful is the self-revelation of intelligence. It is not a process which the empirical subject can describe, but rather an immediate recognition which appears. This moment of recognition is not something which the empirical subject has any sense of ‘doing’, but rather it is something ‘presented’. Intelligence is defined as the power of discernment, and the act which transforms unintelligibility into intelligibility is a manifestation of this power. In fact, this transformational power of intelligence is ‘a priori’ to sensuous intuition, since it is only after the fact of cognizing a gross object that we can attribute the perception of its qualities (hitherto ‘distinctions’) to sensuous intuition.
The common sense view which dictates that gross objects are external to the observer and perceived by the senses, is also a particular form of intelligibility. The intelligibility of something does not necessarily make it true. In fact, our world view is based largely on unexamined assumptions and inference. Empirically, gross objects are configurations which ‘appear’ and no one can doubt their appearance. However, the leap of the common sense view asserting direct perception of a coherent external world, while a workable and heuristic presumption, may upon closer examination prove invalid. In other words, presumptions are inherent in the content of intelligible appearances and, though pragmatically and heuristically necessary, therefore subject to doubt.
The appearance of a snake in the middle of the road is something intelligible, but the subsequent recognition that it is actually a rope belies the truth of the original perception. Thus while we cannot deny the appearance of a snake or any phenomena, their veracity always remains in question. How can we say, with absolute certainty, that behind the appearances of things lies an external world independent of our perception of it? Doubt is the inescapable concommitant of the content of all appearance, no matter how thoroughly tested.
What is the source of the intelligent act which configures the gross object? We do not see the source, only the result. However, into order to make these acts of intelligence intelligible in themselves, we attribute them to the brain, the mind, the inherent intellibility of the external world, God, etc. There are many theories but empirically we see only the result and recognize that what was unintelligible has become intelligible, thus inferring that an act of intelligence has taken place. Generally, the common sense view is that the source of this act is the empirical subject who is himself the intelligent agent responsible for making sense of the contents of his experience. The common sense view, however, is not subtle and stops short of recognizing that the gross objects themselves are intelligent acts. For the naive realist, the gross object is an external given perceived directly by the observer. He does not realize that the gross is object is something configured within experience and he settles for making sense of the relations among these external givens and of their relations with his own given empirical self. He may analyse scientifically the composition of these givens, but he never doubts that they are independent of and external to his own intelligence.SUTRA 5
Subtle objects (memories, ideas, feelings, desires, ego-sense, etc.) are phenomena which are immediate, not attributed presently to sense perception, and considered ‘subjective’.
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Those phenomena which are not attributed directly to sense perception, yet are characterized by meaning and relatedness, are understood as subtle objects. Subtle objects are not configured from the undifferentiated mass of distinctions, and therefore are not held to be objects which are external to the empirical observer. Instead, they are regarded as belonging directly to the subject as subjective states, qualities, characteristics, etc. Subtle objects include the primary ego-sense (i.e., the ‘I’-thought/feeling) as well as its subsidiaries, such as desires, emotions, thoughts, memories, dreams, judgements, values, etc., and while these subsidiary subtle objects are not directly attributable to sense perception, yet, like the empirical subject to which they belong, they do not exist independently of the gross phenomena of the external world. The ego-sense, memories, dreams, desires and emotions involve gross objects, as do judgements, values and concepts. Even the notion of God is meaningful only in relation to a gross time-space universe of which It is the creator.
With the exception of the ego-sense, subtle objects are intermediate intuitions which arise as a function of the relationship between the immediate intuition of the thought-feeling, ‘I am’, and the mediate intuitions of gross objects. While they are not the mediate intuition of configured distinctions (i.e., determinate gross objects), nor the immediate intuition of the indeterminate mass of distinctions, nor the immediate intuition of the ego-sense, nevertheless they arise as dependent yet immediate intuitions belonging to the ego-sense and born of its relationship with the objects and events of the apparent external world. The empirical ego is the primal or root subtle object in the form of the thought-feeling ‘I am’ and it functions as the nexus of all other subtle, as well as gross, objects. The empirical ego is the primal, immediate subtle object to which all other intermediate, subtle objects are subordinate, secondary and derivative. This apperception of self-existence is a form of immediate cognition which sets up the empirical subject as something potentially finite that stands in a time-space relationship with other events, objects and empirical subjects. A host of secondary or subordinate subtle objects, such as desires, values, etc., define the character of the empirical subject and the quality of its relationship with the apparent not-self of the surrounding universe. It is because these secondary subtle objects are subordinate to the empirical subject and are born of its relationship with gross objects that they are termed ‘intermediate intuitions’.
Since neither subjectivity nor objectivity can exist in the absence of an ‘other’, by extension subtle objects belonging to the empirical subject are not independent of the heuristic presumptions which inform the world appearance of gross objects. Thus, subtle objects such as emotions, judgements and desires, arise in relationship to a world of objects which derives its intelligibility from heuristic assumptions. These subtle objects exist by virtue of an (assumed) external world and they will arise even in the presence of illusory objects as when, for example, a subjective emotion of fear arises from the perception of a snake coiled in the road and disappears upon the realization that the snake is actually a rope. In this instance, the emotion of fear arises with an illusion and disappears when the illusion is dispelled. More significantly, the fear of death arises with the heuristic assumption that the survival of the subject is dependent upon the continued survival of the body. The dependence of subjective states upon objective phenomena is obvious, as demonstrated by the following examples: the content of dreams are full of objective phenomena carried over from waking state experience; subjective desires, values, judgements, likes and dislikes pertain to a phenomenal, external world (e.g., ‘He is an honest man.’, ‘That government is corrupt and evil.’, etc.); memories of a past events are based on previous experiences of gross phenomena; and even memories of the subtle content of dreams are ultimately based on gross phenomena carried from the waking state into the dream state. It is impossible to find an instance where a subtle object arises without a final reference to external, determinate phenomena. Even the subjective feeling of hunger arises in reference to the body which is a perceived, gross object and, as such, is external to the empirical subject to which it belongs.SUTRA 6
The empirical subject is a subtle object which exists in reference to the gross body.
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The two poles of the subject-object dyad must necessarily come into being simultaneously since neither can exist independently. Thus, the birth of the empirical subject (the root thought/feeling ‘I am’) must be matched by the birth of a gross object which it perceives. Theoretically, the first object of awareness could be anything but, practically, since the common view is that the physical senses must first exist before any other object can be perceived, the body with its senses must be the original gross object known to the empirical subject.
Within the unitary mass of consciousness-as-distinctions occurs a split. What causes this split? There are a number of theories, but our concern here is to examine the composition of experience rather than to speculate on how experience came into being or on what is the causal impetus for the split. In fact, this split into the subject-object dyad is not a true split, since a true split (such as breaking a rock into two pieces) would result in two independent rocks, whereas the two poles of the subject-object dyad are absolutely dependent upon each other and, within the context of experience, can never be separated from one another.
With the immediate intuition of the thought-feeling ‘I am’ arises consciousness of the body. The body, configured from the indeterminate mass of distinctions, arises with the ‘I’-thought/feeling and is the support of the empirical subject; conversely, the ‘I’-thought/feeling arises with body-consciousness and is the support of the body. Without the immediate intuition of ‘I am’, the body cannot be known (as there will be no knower), and without the body-consciousness the ‘I’-thought/feeling will have no empirical referent which will validate the thought/feeling of self-existence. Thus, the first principle of the empirical subject is the notion, ‘I am the body’ or ‘I am within the body’, and this assumption, which automatically and of necessity locates the subject within time and space, operates as the fundamental organizing principle of the entire world-appearance.
Previously we stated that the empirical subject, although a subtle object, is an immediate intuition, while all other subtle objects are subordinate, intermediate intuitions. The term ‘intermediate’ is used simply to emphasize a distinction between the empirical subject and its subjective states, since all subtle objects are, in fact, immediate. The immediate intuition of the ‘I’- thought/feeling is also dependent and can arise only in conjunction with a gross object, viz., the body. Other subtle objects are intermediate because they arise as a function of the relationship between the empirical subject and and its gross objects, including the body to which it belongs. Thus, the empirical subject is the primal subtle object while all others are secondary, derivative and dependent upon the empirical subject’s identification with the determinate gross body.SUTRA 7
The body and the subtle empirical subject are both objects of knowledge.
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The body is a mediate, gross, determinate object and the empirical subject is an immediate, subtle object, i.e., the ‘I’-thought/feeling. Since both of these are objects which are known, the question naturally arises, ‘To whom are they known?’. The naive realist does not ask this question because, for him, the empirical subject is an unexamined given who is the knower of gross objects and of his own subjective states. He does not question that his own ‘subjectivity’ may in fact be objective, nor does he reflect that his standing in a temporal-spacial relationship with gross objects, even with his own body, objectifies him as an empirical subject. This empirical subject is the ‘I’-thought/feeling identified with the body, and it is this objective entity for whom relationships with gross objects are established in time and space. Yet the knower of the body (or of any other object) cannot be both an object and a knower, and since the subtle thought/feeling, ‘I am’, is a known object, who then is the knower of this empirical ‘I am’? Since it cannot therefore be the empirical subject who is the knower of any other gross or subtle objects, then only a non-empirical subject can know an object and, if this subject is non-empirical and indeterminate, it must by definition transcend the boundaries of time and space. Thus we are forced to conclude that knowledge of whatever is determinate, including the empirical subject and his subjective states, must presuppose a pure or transcendental subject.
In what sense, exactly, is the empirical subject determinate? To begin with, the ‘I’-thought/feeling is something differentiated within general experience. This thought/feeling is subtle and imprecise in its initial development. However, as body-consciousness and then world-consciousness unfolds, the ‘I’-thought/feeling accumulates an increasingly precise self-definition in the form of predicates, such as in ‘I am a male, I live in Canada, my background is British, I like this, I dislike that, I believe in some such…’, etc. As pointed out earlier, the ‘I’-thought/feeling is one pole of a unitary subject-object dyad, in which neither pole can exist in the absence of the other. The subtle ‘I’-thought/feeling arises simulaneously with body-consciousness and with this comes a firm identification of the ‘I am’ with the body in the form, ‘I am the body.’. Gross objects, as known phenomena, cannot exist in the absence of an empirical subject, since without the temporal and spacial locus provided by the empirical subject there can be no coherence of perception pertaining to the qualities which configure objects or to the relationships among objects or to the relationship of objects with the subject. In the subject-object dyad, determinateness cannot be limited to the object-pole alone as the object cannot be separated from the subject. The object is determined by its relationship with the subject, as is the empirical subject determined by its relationship with the object. Thus, determinateness is born with the inception of the subject-object dyad and is characteristic of both poles.
It is the entire, determinate subject-object dyad with its continually unfolding content which is known. However, this knowledge does not belong to the empirical subject, since he is included in the totality of what is determinate and known. Then to whom does this knowledge belong? It is the pure or transcendental subject within whom arises the appearance of the subject-object dyad to whom this knowledge belongs. In fact, the appearance itself is the knowledge, and this is what belongs to the transcendental subject. The term ‘belonging’, however, is merely a way of speaking, since what is determinate and time-space bound (the subject-object dyad) can have no specific relationship with what is indeterminate and neither time nor space bound (the transcendental subject). The appearance simply appears and disappears within the indeterminate, transcendental subject. What appears is what is known and when the appearance disappears, as in deep sleep, nothing determinate is known; the transcendental subject remains as what it is, which is the transcendental context within which all experience – waking, dreaming and sleeping -- arises and subsides.SUTRA 8
An object of knowledge is always an appearance.
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At this point, it will be useful to discuss the nature of ‘objects’ in more detail. To begin with, the content of all appearance is ‘objective’, that is to say, whatever is content is what is perceived. Now objects may be distinquished, for the purposes of this enquiry, as gross and subtle. In the common view, gross objects are held to be those perceptibles which are perceived directly through the agency of the physical senses of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling. In other words, unless at least one of these senses is functioning, gross objects cannot be experienced. By definition, their apprehension is ‘sensuous’. Subtle objects are held to be those perceptibles which may be perceived in the absence of the direct involvement of the senses, such as thoughts, memories, feelings, desires, ego-sense, etc. By definition, their apprehension is ‘non-sensuous’. Subtle objects are indirectly dependent on the senses, as in the case of a memory of an earlier sense-contact with a gross object or a desire to re-experience an earlier sense-pleasure. Thus, the dividing line between the two catagories of subtle and gross objects is simply the immediate involvement or non-involvement of the senses.
In the Prologue, we avoided attributing the experience of gross objects (e.g., a chair) to the operation of the senses. Instead, it was stated that gross objects where the result of the collocation of previously undifferentiated distinctions and that this collocation was an interpretative process. Distinctions are an immediate (i.e., non-interpretative) apprehension, whereas gross objects are a mediate (i.e., interpretative) apprehension. Appearances, however, whether of immediate, undifferentiated distinctions or of mediate, differentiated gross objects are themselves always immediate. What is being established here is a distinction between the content of experience which is non-interpretive and the content which is interpretive. Gross objects and their relations with each other are interpretive, therefore relative and subject to doubt. The attribution of the perception of gross objects to the contact of the senses with their objects is also interpretive, i.e., inferential. This inference may be true, but the history of philosophy shows that even this obvious assumption has been called into question time and again. We see our eyes in a mirror and we cannot question this appearance. But is it our eyes that are seeing our eyes in the mirror or is the appearance of our eyes in the mirror purely a mental phenomenon without reference to an actual material, external world, as some idealist schools of philosophy hold? After all, even our senses are an appearance. We cannot directly see our eyes seeing, for that would require a second seer seeing our eyes seeing and a third seer seeing the second seer, etc., in a vicious infinite. We can only infer that it is our eyes which are seeing when when we see our eyes reflected in the mirror. Seeing our eyes in a mirror is not seeing the seeing of the eyes in the mirror. By extension, we cannot see the seeing of another who is looking at us, we can only see the eyes of the other looking at us and infer that he is seeing us. Our whole world of experience is built up of inferences which are largely corroborated by futher appearances, but which may at any future moment be invalidated. The notion that the senses are perceiving external, independent objects is an obvious, pragmatic assumption, but proving it is another matter and we are driven back to acknowledging that the appearance of the seemingly incontrovertible conviction that the senses are directly perceiving external objects is unquestionable, but that the conviction itself is interpretive and subject to doubt.
Whatever appears is, in the very act of appearing, known. To appear is to be known, and what is known is the appearance. In fact, appearance itself is the only knowledge which is beyond doubt. The content of appearance may prove to be false, as in the case of hallucination or mirage, but no one can doubt the appearance itself. This is the single certainty we have with regard to knowledge and experience; the rest is tentative. At one instant what appears as a snake coiled in the road may, in a following instant, appear as the question, ‘Is this really a snake?’, and in a third instant appear as the realization, ‘This is actually a rope.’. At each successive instant there is no doubt that what is appearing is what is appearing, yet the content of each appearance is continually transforming. Even the final realization, ‘This is a rope.’, may ultimately turn out to be false. Other than the knowing which is the appearance itself, all knowledge is heuristic. Heuristic knowledge has pragmatic value, allowing for decisions, actions, discoveries, innovations, agreements, cooperation, etc., but this knowledge is inherently subject to error and may be invalidated or modified at any immediately following moment.
An appearance is made up of its content, which will include: the primal mass of undifferentiated distinctions; gross objects and their qualities; the subtle phenomena of thoughts, emotions, dreams, desires, memories, the ego-sense (the ‘I’- thought/feeling), etc.; and even the dark forgetfulness of sleep. The appearance and the known are identical, and thus certain knowledge is of the appearance itself and not of an hypothetical or inferred, noumenal ‘thing-in-itself’ standing behind the appearance. The empirical self is also part of the appearance, appearing as the ‘I’-thought/feeling (with its attendant self-definitions, feeling states, etc.) or ego-sense which is accompanied by the feeling or belief that it is a perceiver perceiving other objects and events. The triad of perceiver, act of perceiving and perceived collectively make up the content of the appearance. That part of the content of an appearance which takes the form of the conviction, ‘I am the perceiver perceiving this chair.’, upon deeper enquiry is called into question, yet the conviction itself is known without question as belonging to the appearance. The knowledge of the nature of the perceived and of the perceiver as content may be questioned, but the knowing or appearance of that knowledge-content is itself unquestionable. Thus both the object and the subject (empirical self) are content of the same appearance which is known. Now a ‘known’ presupposes a ‘knower’, and in this case the knower is not identified with or limited to the perceiver part of the content of the appearance. This knower is not the empirical self and is not traceable to a time-space location around which the world-appearance is organized. Some intelligent knower apprehends both the object and its apparent perceiver (the empirical self), both of which appear simultaneously in the same appearance. Where then is this intelligent knower located? The answer is ‘nowhere’ or, what comes to the same thing, ‘everywhere’. This knower cannot be identified with any specific content of the appearance, rather it underlies and pervades the appearance; in other words, the knower is not distinguishable from the known, except for one qualification: that the content of the known is in constant transformation while the quality of knowingness associated with the knower persists throughout unchanging.SUTRA 9
Before the body and the empirical self, I am.
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The transcendental subject has no relationship with either gross or subtle objects, since there can be no direct relationship between that which is infinite and formless and that which is finite and determinate. It is here that a distinction must be made between the a priori transcendental ‘I am’ and the empirical thought/feeling, ‘I am’. The empirical ‘I am’ is an immediate intuition which arises simultaneously with the apprehension of otherness (or non-self) in the form of mediate, gross objects, while the transcendental ‘I am’ is self-revealing rather than intuited or perceived. The transcendental ‘I am’ cannot directly intuit itself, since it is the intelligence which is intuiting and not the intuition itself; moreover, it does not need to intuit itself in order to reveal itself, since its very nature is self-revealing. The thought, “There is a transcendental ‘I am’” is a subtle object belonging to the empirical ‘I am’ rather than a direct intuition of the transcendental ‘I am’, whereas the latter is self-revealing as the a priori intelligence which permeates and supports the constant flux of intuition. The empirical ‘I am’ is qualified by its attendant subjective states (subtle objects in the form of desires, values, etc.), while the transcendental ‘I am’ is unqualified and, therefore, pure. Just as the intuitions of ‘I’ and ‘otherness’ are known within the transcendental ‘I am’, equally the undifferentiated mass of distinctions from which determinate objects are configured are also known. It is by virtue of the transcendental self that the undifferentiated mass of distinctions are revealed as ‘something is happening’, as the appearance of undifferentiated‘stuff’ which precedes the inception of the subject-object dyad.
The undifferentiated mass of distinctions are known in that they appear, yet their known-ness is not a function of a subject-object relationship. They are not apprehended by an empirical subject, yet their very appearance is their apprehension. Since they are an undifferentiated mass of ‘somethingness’ they may be characterized as pure, indeterminate experience. What differentiates them from the transcendental ‘I am’ is this: that their existence as ‘consciousness-as-distinctions’ is known by virtue of appearing, whereas the transcendental ‘I am’ does not appear and therefore is not apprehended as a known. The pure intelligence which is the transcendental ‘I am’ is the substratum of appearance, for in its absence there will not arise the ‘consciousness-as-distinctions’ which is the indeterminate ground of the determinate world-appearance. The substratum of the transcendental ‘I am’ is neither indeterminate nor determinate, yet in its absence neither characteristic will appear, i.e., neither pure nor diverse experience will arise and therefore no form of knowledge will arise. Within the context of experience, the transcendental ‘I am’ is indentified as pure intelligence since apprehension necessarily presupposes intelligence; intelligence itself, however, cannot be apprehended since it must always remain that within which apprehension occurs and by which apprehension is permeated. The content of appearance is continually transforming, yet the power of apprehension remains constant throughout. An intelligent constant is apprehending the content of the three states of consciousness (waking, sleeping, dreaming) in an unbroken continuum; this constant is the transcendent ‘I am’ which is the apprehending intelligence permeating all appearance.
Indeterminate distinctions and determinate forms rise and fall within the transcendental ‘I am’. Their appearance is their apprehension and they appear by virtue of the transcendental self. How then can we say that there is no relationship between the contents of appearance which are finite and determinate and the formless intelligence which permeates and apprehends them? To begin with we must define what is meant by the term ‘relationship’. For the purpose of this essay, we will define relationship as the temporal and/or spatial juxtaposition of two or more delimited objects or events. We may consider subjective states, such as sadness or desire, as events since these states are delimited both by time as well as the relationship of the empirical subject with other objects and events. In subjective states such as sleep, coma or the nirvikalpa samadhi of deep meditation, in which all cognitive activity has ceased, time is the sole delimiting factor.
Thoughout all of the delimited subjective states and phenomenal events of a lifetime, including sleep, dreams, waking activities, meditative states, comas and even paranormal and near-death experiences, the continuity of the ‘I am’ is never questioned nor doubted. This intelligent constant is the unchanging, non-objective, non-subjective integrating principle underlying all passing phenomena, states and indeterminate ‘stuff’ which constitute experience. Unlike the determinate experience of the subject-object dyad, this constant is transcendental to time and space, and therefore free from limiting conditions. As such, it is not subject to relationships as defined above. This intelligent ‘I am’ functions as a self-luminous medium within which phenomenal events occur, rather than as an event itself. If two waves passing through a medium such as water intersect, we can define their relationship in terms of time, space, motion and mutual effect, but how can we define the relationship of a wave to the medium through which it is passing? If the medium is infinite and void of any determinate content except for a single wave, how can we describe the wave as an event in time and space? Without another wave or an empirical subject, what is the reference point? How can it be measured? There will be no way of determining if the wave is moving, persisting or occupying space and its very existence will be indeterminable. So how, then, will it be possible to characterize its relationship with the medium in which is exists? Certainly not in any empirical or definable sense. In the absence of another wave or empirical observer also located within the medium, the single wave cannot in any sense be measured or determined as either existing or non-existing. So in what sense, then, is it possible to assert that the wave has a relationship with the medium through which it is passing? It cannot be so asserted and therefore the wave’s empirical existence and relationships are confined to the other content existing within the medium. Yet, it is not quite accurate to say that there is absolutely no relationship between the wave and its medium (in this case, water), since in the absence of some such medium the wave cannot possibly exist nor have relationships with other content (as in the case of two waves intersecting). Paradoxically, then, a wave can have no relationship with its medium (as defined above), yet in the absence of its medium it can neither exist nor relate to other waves occuring within the medium. In the context of experience and its contents, the medium is the transcendental ‘I am’ and the single wave is the empirical ‘I’-thought/feeling. There is no relationship between the empirical and the transcendental ‘I am’ and, in fact, the empirical ‘I am’ can only be defined in relationship to other content appearing within the transcendental self. Nevertheless, and paradoxically, it is not absolutely accurate to say that there is no relationship between transcendental and the empirical ‘I am’, since the empirical self is clearly dependent on the transcendental self for its phenomenal existence. Like a wave in water, the empirical subject moves through and exists by virtue of the transcendental self which is its medium or ground, as well as the ground of all other phenomena by which the empirical subject can measure and define itself.
Referring to the transcendental ‘I am’ as a medium is by way of analogy only. Since we generally think of a medium as occupying space, it is easy to conceive of the transcendental self as resembling an infinite void, but such a conception would condition the transcendental self which, being transcendental, is necessarily unconditioned and therefore beyond the limiting definition of an infinite void. Even referring to it as intelligence, consciousness or power, is to confine it to a human conception, whereas being transcendental it must be beyond all conception. So then, how do we know that it exists? The very question is improper, since the terms existence and non-existence impose conditions upon what is beyond all conditions and limit what is unlimited it to a human conception – a conception which exists by virtue of the very reality it is attempting to define. Probably the closest we can approximate it through the symbols of language is to say that it is neither something nor nothing, neither not-something nor not-nothing, but unspeakable. The transcendental ‘I am’ is self-revealing and self-luminous, not in the positive sense of an intuition or perception of its own existence, but in the negative sense that the ‘I am’ is never doubted. It is possible to doubt anything that the senses or thinking presents to the doubter, but the doubter himself can never be doubted. A degree of self-awareness persists throughout all experience, even sleep or coma, and it is this absolute conviction of the reality of the self which is the self-revealing, self-luminous nature of the transcendental ‘I am’. For the pragmatic purposes of philosophy, however, in some contexts we may refer to it using positive terms, such as intelligence, being, pure consciousness, etc., and in other contexts using negative terms, such as emptiness, unconditioned, unknowable, etc., but all such terms merely attempt to point in the direction of that which by definition transcends the range of thought, observation and any form of experience. In Vedantic philosophy the transcendental ‘I am’ is given the sanskrit name, atman.SUTRA 10
The transcendental self is the knower of all appearance.
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The empirical self functions as the locus around which the contents of the world-appearance are organized. Thus, the chair is perceived from a certain angle, at a certain distance, at a particular time of the day, etc. In the absence of a locus of perception there can be no perceived object, since all objects are perceived in relationship to an empirical observer. If there is no locus, there can be no world-appearance. In the common sense view, an object theoretically can be perceived directly from an infinite number of viewpoints, thus producing an infinite number of different images of the same object. This viewpoint presumes that there is a concrete subject surrounded by concrete objects which in turn can be viewed in an infinite variety of ways depending upon the relative position of the subject and its objects. This is a pragmatic assumption which must be respected for its value in organizing the affairs of daily life. However, inherent in this assumption is the identification of the ‘knower’ of the object(s) with the empirical subject, specifically the body-mind. We never say, ‘This body is looking at the chair.’ or ‘This body is sitting in its chair.’, but rather, ‘I am looking at, sitting in, etc., the chair.’. This latter statement presumes a delimiting identification of a knowing ‘I’ with the body or with a mind inside the body and, in either case, the ‘I am’ who knows is referred to as the empirical self or perceiver. However, this empirical ‘I’ is also content of the world-appearance and perceived as the locus of that same world-appearance, and as such is ‘known’. Now, who is perceiving and knowing the empirical ‘I’ which is the locus and, simultaneously, content of the world appearance? The empirical ‘I’ or self cannot be both the knower and the known, the perceiver and the perceived, and since the empirical self is clearly content of any appearance the true and immediate ‘knower’ must be other than this determinate self. This immediate knower must be non-empirical and transcendental to the content of any appearance, and may be referred to as the transcendental knower, subject, self or ‘I am’, and it is this non-local, non-temporal knower which apprehends or intuits the content of appearance, including the empirical ‘I’-thought/feeling. Since this transcendental knower is not limited to any specific content of any appearance it therefore can be perceived neither sensuously nor non-sensuously, as in the case of gross and subtle objects respectively; in fact, it cannot be perceived at all.
This naturally raises the objection, ‘How can this knower be proven; how can we establish non-inferentially that it has being or that it exists?’. The fact is, such an assertion cannot be proven either logically or empirically. Both logic and empiricism function within the domain of content whereas the transcendental self is contentless. Yet, we are forced to posit a transcendental knower since the alternative of a specific content of appearance being both the known and the knower is inconceivable. Thus, we arrive at the transcendental self, not positively through the testimony of direct experience, but negatively through a process of elimination. If a sceptic were to challenge this axiomatic principle of a transcendental knower, by asserting that he could just as validly posit the non-existence of the same, then he would be forced to deny the very fact of experience itself, since the whole problem of the knower as an empirical or non-empirical being arises from the incontestible recognition that experience ‘happens’ and therefore exists. The existence of experience cannot be doubted, but when the experiencer is searched for we cannot find him and yet we cannot deny him without denying experience itself. It is this dual impossibility of either denying or proving empirically the existence of the knower which forces us into the position of asserting that he does not fall into either category of existence or non-existence, but is the self-revealing, self-luminous transcendental context of both.SUTRA 11
If the noumenal is denied then any real function of the senses in the production of the world-appearance is denied.
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From where does the indeterminate mass of distinctions arise? We could argue that it is a direct product of the transcendental intelligence which is the substratum or medium of experience and its contents. If such was the case, then what real function could we assign to the senses? The transcendental self would simply bypass the senses, generating appearances directly, and the apparent necessity of the senses in formulating perception would be bogus. Or, alternatively, the transcendental self would rest utterly passive and appearances would appear as if by magic, having no other source than themselves, which is inconceivable. Furthermore, what would be the function of distinctions? They form the indeterminate ground from which objects are configured, but the transcendental self would require no such intermediate ground for the creation of the world-appearance and would simply create the world-appearance directly.
The senses appear in a two-fold manner as gross objects (eyes, ears, skin, nose, tongue) and as five modes of sensuous experience (seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting); if the transcendental self simply creates the world-appearance spontaneously, then what could be the relationship between the physical sense organs and sensuous experience itself? There would be no necessity of eyes to see, ears to hear, etc.; there would simply be seeing, hearing, and so forth; the role of the gross sense organs would be merely ornamental and serve no purpose except as props in a purely mental theatre. This is the greatest weakness of the idealist denial of a reality external to appearance and possibly the strongest argument against metaphysical solipsism. The necessity of the act of opening the eyelids as prerequisite to seeing a gross object, such as a chair, is a most compelling argument for a direct relationship between the physical eyes and the content of seeing itself. To suggest that the apparent necessity of the eyes opening prior to visual perception is merely fictitious or accidental strains all credulity. What the physical senses point to is a reality which is other than the appearance itself, as in the case of the physical eyes and the seeing of a chair, where the apparently necessary operation of the eyes indicates a reality ulterior to the appearance of the chair. Of course, the visual organs and their operations (such as opening the eyelids) are appearances also and, as with all gross objects, they too are configured from the indeterminate mass of ‘consciousness-as-distinctions’. How then can we prove that there is a reality ulterior to the appearance of the eyes which plays a role in the production of the visual appearance of the eyes themselves? We cannot. Since all empirical knowledge is confined to the realm of appearance, it is impossible to directly prove or validate the existence of a parallel reality external to the appearance of the eyes and other sense organs. Yet, to deny such a reality is to put the lie to any genuine function of the organs of sense in producing the visual, etc., apprehension of objective phenomena such as eyes and chairs. Therefore, we posit the noumenal on the argument that the function of the physical senses is not merely ornamental or the trickery of a divine Juggler, but necessary for the production of the sensual content of appearance.
What then can we affirm definitively about the noumenal? Only that it exists based on the indirect testimony of the senses. We can presume, not prove, that there is some kind of structural concommitance between the phenomena of appearance and a noumenal ground from which the content of appearance arises. Science is essentially the systematic effort to grasp the noumenal through the phenomenal; it is process of ‘mapping’ the noumenal through a combination of observing, theorizing, testing and validating. The mapping is then confirmed or invalidated or modified through further testing over time. What appears to be true today may be invalidated tomorrow as the result of new information. This is a perpetual possibility concerning all empirical experience, making doubt an inherent factor of all aspects of the world appearance. These ‘maps’ are phenomenal representations of the noumenal and, analogous to road-maps, enable us to navigate an otherwise unknown terrain. Of course, it is a mistake to confuse the map with the terrain itself, but that is what the naïve realist does unconsciously.
A distinction must be made between the transcendental self, which is the medium within which phenomena appear, and the noumenal ground which is the underlying basis of the content of appearances. It is the noumenal which determines the composition of the mass of indeterminate distinctions and which limits the range of possibilities for configuring the distinctions into objective phenomena. It is the concommitant structure of the noumenal which allows for continuity and agreement concerning the makeup of the universe and provides a coherent foundation for daily life. The phenomenal representation which we call the human body has as its ground the noumenal concommitant of the organs of sense, brain functioning, nervous system, etc.
What we call phenomena are manifestations of the noumenal, but we must be careful to not assume that the former are true representations of the latter or that each phenomenal object has its concommitant noumenal object. A chair can be viewed from an infinite number of perspectives; its surface can be scrutinized under a microscope; it can be dissected in order to understand better its molecular and cellular make-up, etc. The possibilities are endless. Each phenomenal representation of what is termed ‘chair’ will be distinct and it will be impossible to identify most of these representations as belonging to the same chair without prior knowledge that they belong to that specific, phenomenal object. There is a noumenal concommitant to each of these representations, but we cannot say that these phenomenal representations all belong to the same noumenal chair for the reason that there is no noumenal chair, merely a structural concommitant to that assemblage of representations which are collectively identified as a specific phenomenon, a chair. The discrete object named ‘chair’ is limited to the phenomenal realm. In general, determinate sense objects, such as chairs, are discrete and clearly separate from one another. Can we therefore assume that discreteness also pertains to the noumenal? We cannot. We can hypothesize discreteness, but we cannot prove it. Even the existence of the noumenal is unproven and is posited solely on the indirect testimony of the senses. We may reasonably and pragmatically assert that there is a stuctural concommitance to all phenomena called the noumenal, but beyond this all that we are left with are theories about the noumenal. Beyond arguing that there is a noumenal concommitant to appearances, we cannot specify the true make-up of that concommitance. There is no noumenal ‘chair’, but merely a noumenal concommitant to the appearance of a chair. The phenomenal does not give us any certainty with regard to the noumenal, and this is the true source of doubt. Scientific theory is constantly being overturned or modified as new information is uncovered. Has any scientific theory ever proven to be final? Can any theory be upheld as the last word when a constantly unfolding present always holds the possibility of a new or contradictory revelation or discovery? Our phenomenal maps of the noumenal are at best limited and tentative, their true value being heuristic. It is not possible for the observer to carry his empiricism directly from the phenomenal to the noumenal; all he can ever know directly is the appearance itself, an appearance which at any moment may prove to be a very poor representation of its noumenal concommitant.SUTRA 12
The noumenal and the phenomenal may be termed ‘reflexible- concommitant’ and ‘reflected-concommitant’, respectively.
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Having acknowledged that the transcendental self, by virture of being transcendental, is beyond all definition, yet for the purposes of practical philosophy we refer to it as pure intelligence and as the medium within which appearances appear. We have also posited the noumenal on the indirect testimony arising from the appearance of the senses and argue that the noumenal is the ground of the specific content of appearances. We have further argued that there can be no direct relationship between phenomena and the transcendental self, except in the transcendental self’s capacity as a reflecting medium within which phenomena appear. What then is the noumenal’s relationship with the transcendental self? As with the phenomenal, the noumenal can have no direct relationship with the transcendental self which, being neither existent nor non-existent, is limitless, formless and, ultimately, unspeakable. Nevertheless, the transcendental self functions as an indefinable medium within which the noumenal is reflected as the phenomenal. Since the noumenal is not directly accessible to the empirical observer, it is impossible to characterize, by means of the senses, the nature of the relationship of the noumenal with the phenomenal; thus, instead of attempting to establish an unprovable line of causality between the two, we simply assert a concommitance or parallel co-existence.
In this essay, the use of the word ‘concommitance’ is significant. There will be a tendency to assume that an appearance replicates the noumenal in much the same way as a photograph replicates its object and, while this analogy is a useful illustration, we must be careful not to take it too far. A photograph can be compared with its object when an observer examines the relative similarity of the appearance of the photograph with the appearance of its object; between the phenomenal and the noumenal, however, no such comparision is possible. In the case of the photograph and its object, both are known phenomena and their similarities are observable, whereas with the phenomenal and the noumenal the latter can never be scrutinized by an observer since by definition it is not an appearance and can never be one. Thus, we cannot speak of noumenal objects, noumenal qualities, noumenal distinctions, noumenal substance, noumenal space, noumenal time, etc. The empirical realities of objects, qualities, distinctions, space, time, etc., exist within the realm of the phenomenal only and they cannot be legitimately transferred over to the non-empirical, non-observable noumenal. Since we posit the noumenal on the indirect testimony of the senses, we may posit, on that same indirect testimony, a concommitance between the content of appearances and the composition and structure (whatever that may be) of the noumenal. Now, since the transcendental self is the medium or substratum of appearances and since the noumenal is the ground of the content of appearances, we may describe the noumenal as the ‘reflexible-concommitant’ of phenomena; that is, the noumenal has the capacity to be reflected or illumined, through the operation of the senses and their accessories, within the medium of the transcendental self, hence it is ‘reflexible’. In other words, inherent in the noumenal is the capacity to be reflected within a medium which has the capacity to reflect or illumine. The reflection itself, which is the phenomenal, may be described as the ‘reflected-concommitant’, i.e., the noumenal reflected or illumined within the medium of the transcendental self. Consciousness is the power (skt. sakti) inherent in pure intelligence (skt. atman) to reflect or illumine the noumenal. In other words, pure intelligence has the capacity to manifest as ‘consciousness of’ the noumenal in the form of appearances. The belief that it is the empirical subject which is conscious of objective phenomena is erroneous; rather, it is the transcendental self which is conscious of the noumenal in the form of appearances and one of these appearances is the mistaken belief that the power of consciousness belongs to the empirical rather than transcendental self. Consciousness is the illumination of the noumenal and this consciousness is knowledge in the form of phenomena, both gross and subtle. As pointed out earlier, knowledge necessarily implies intelligence and since knowledge is a manifestation of the reflecting or illuminating power of the transcendental self, we refer to this self as pure intelligence. Additionally, subtle phenomena, such as dreams, memories, ideas, feelings, etc., are also the ‘reflected-concommitant’ of the noumenal, which in turn is the ‘reflexible-concommitant’ or ground of the content of these subtle appearances. In this case, it is the accessories of the senses alone (i.e., other aspects of the nervous system, such as the brain, etc.) rather than the sense organs themselves which are directly involved. Thus, whatever appears as phenomena, whether gross or subtle, has its concommitant in the noumenal and it is this relationship of concommitance at all levels which allows us to ‘map’ the noumenal for both theoretical and practical purposes. Finally, even our ‘maps’ are phenomena which also have their concommitant within the noumenal.SUTRA 13
Phenomena are at once a mode of consciousness and a reflection of the noumenal, they have no being in themselves.
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Phenomena, both gross and subtle, are the co-incidence of the noumenal with the transcendental self; they are the noumenal reflected or illuminated within the transcendental field of pure intelligence. Phenomena have their being as appearances; they exist as experience and, as stated in the prologue, experience is the only certain existence there is. Enquiring into the nature of experience we are led to the transcendental self and to the noumenal, not directly through observation, but indirectly through the testimony of the organs of sense (in the case of the noumenal) and through negation combined with the self-revealing, self-luminous nature of pure intelligence (in the case of the transcendental self). In the absence of the noumenal, therefore, neither phenomena nor the undifferentiated mass of distinctions which is their ground will arise and the transcendental self will remain unrevealed; conversely, in the absence of the transcendental self, phenomena will not appear and the noumenal will also remain unrevealed. It is the revelation of the phenomenal which points in both directions, so to speak: to the noumenal as the ultimate ground of the content of experience, on the one hand, and to the transcendental as the self-luminous medium of experience, on the other hand.
At this point, the question naturally arises, ‘What is the nature of the being of phenomena or do they even have being?’. To this we reply that phenomena have undeniable being, but not independently of the transcendental self which is their medium nor of the noumenal which is their ground. It is the apparent discreteness of objects which gives them a seemingly external and independent being or a ‘being-in-themselves’. However, discreteness is an appearance which closer examination will always call into question. Empirically, phenomena are at best relatively, rather than absolutely, discrete and this is certainly shown to be so at their sub-atomic level. Appearances have their being within the transcendental self by virtue of its reflecting capacity: their being is ‘borrowed’ from the medium in which they appear. The transcendental self, by definition, is beyond both being and non-being, yet due to its self-luminosity has the capacity to manifest being in the form of appearances. The content or absence thereof of the three ordinary states of consciousness (waking, dreaming and sleeping) are the co-incidence of the noumenal and the transcendental self. The ground of the content of waking and dreaming states, as well as the non-content of the sleeping state, is the noumenal, but all three have their being within and by virtue of the transcendental self. The being of experience is real and cannot be denied, but this being is not independent of the pure intelligence within which it exists. It could alternatively be said that the being of experience is borrowed from that illuminating transcendent principle which is beyond both being and non-being, yet which has the capacity to manifest being as both phenomena (‘somethingness’) and void (‘nothingness’).SUTRA 14
The noumenal and the phenomenal are, respectively, pure cause and pure effect.
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The theory of cause and effect attempts to explain the relational influence among visible events and among visible and invisible events. In the case of the former, an example would be the collision of billiard balls and in the latter the manifestation of a cancer. If the enquiry is pushed, the former invariably leads to the latter when, as in the case of the billiard balls, the observation of their collision leads to the question, ‘How was the inertia of the original collection of balls overcome?’. At the level of purely visible events it is obvious that ball A displaced ball B causing the latter to displace ball C, but explaining why the collision of billiard ball A with billiard ball B actually displaces B takes us directly into the invisible. Why, for example, when ball A strikes ball B does B not simply remain unmoving and A come to a halt as well? This cannot be explained by simple observation and leads to a deeper enquiry utilizing the theory of cause and effect as a tool of investigation. The theory of cause and effect is of paramount importance in mapping the noumenal, yet the validity of this theory is rarely questioned except in the rarified discussions of theorists. The notion of causality exists as a subtle object which, according to the notion itself, must be the effect of a causal factor or of a complex of causal factors. That which is perceived, whether gross or subtle, is always the effect of something else and whatever is presented in the mind is always, at the moment of cognition, an effect. Whether the cognition be of an event, a stationary or moving object, an organism, a memory, an emotion, a sensation, a dream, a hallucination, a concept, etc., we can always ask the question, ‘What caused it?’: the ‘it’ being always the effect of some cause or complex of causes. The perception of ball A striking and displacing ball B is total effect, and the notion (which is also an effect) that ball B is displaced because it is struck by ball A is an attempt to explain the phenomenon. In fact, any sentence which includes the word ‘because’ is employing the theory of cause and effect. If we remove the notion of causality from our thinking, then what we are left with is simply a continual transformation of the content of appearances, which is neither cause nor effect. Experience, being dynamic rather than static, is a perpetual modification of its content and is neither cause nor effect until we ask the question, ‘How did X become Y?’. Once the notion of cause is introduced, by that very invocation the entire field of experience is turned into effect. The theory of cause and effect, therefore, presupposes a noumenal ‘reflexible concommitant’ of the phenomenal ‘reflected concommitant’, and the mental effort to grasp the invisible cause of events (phenomena) is an effort to grasp the noumenal itself. Of course, this effort to grasp the noumenal (which is set up by the presupposition of the validity of the theory of cause and effect) will never satisfy our longing since whatever we grasp, however profound or all-encompassing, will be confined to the phenomenal realm alone, with the noumenal always receding at the horizon.
